I think it may be helpful to include a debate of this piece between me and GPT-4, as the debate may help clarify some of the ideas.
Me:
Give three strong arguments against the "main argument" of the following article:
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GPT-4:
1. The article's main argument relies heavily on the assumption that consciousness can only be validated through self-reporting. However, this perspective is limiting and ignores the potential for other methods of determining consciousness. For example, neuroscientific advancements could lead to the discovery of specific neural correlates of consciousness, which would provide more objective measures of consciousness beyond self-reporting.
2. The article's conclusion that accounts of consciousness are impossible due to the inherent subjectivity of consciousness and the potential inaccuracy of self-reporting is overly pessimistic. While it is true that consciousness is subjective, this does not mean that we cannot develop a better understanding of it or create more reliable methods for determining consciousness. As our understanding of the brain and cognitive processes continues to grow, it is likely that we will develop more sophisticated and accurate ways to assess consciousness in both humans and AI systems.
3. The article's reliance on Pylyshyn's argument, which suggests that replacing brain cells with integrated circuit chips would eventually lead to a loss of consciousness, is not necessarily valid. This argument assumes that consciousness is solely dependent on the biological nature of the brain, rather than the functional organization of the brain's processes. It is possible that consciousness could be preserved even if the brain's cells were replaced with artificial components, as long as the functional organization and processes of the brain remain intact. Therefore, the article's claim that we cannot prove Pylyshyn wrong is not a strong argument against the possibility of determining consciousness in AI systems.
Me:
(1) Wouldn't that specific neural correlate be based on self-reports? That is, wouldn't it be possible (albeit unlikely) that there's a person who doesn't have that specific neural correlate, and yet is conscious? As a better thought experiment, imagine someone who is like that: someone who is conscious but doesn't have that specific neural correlate. How would you tell whether or not they're conscious?
(2) I think the worry is deeper than that. The worry is something like "all the science measures is what sorts of things are correlated with reports of consciousness, not consciousness itself". So yes, we may get better at determining whether humans and AIs will report consciousness, but that doesn't mean we're actually getting better at detecting consciousness.
(3) In order for the argument to be airtight, isn't the possibility enough? In other words, I think all the author needs to prove their argument is that Pylyshyn's argument cannot be disproven. It doesn't have to show that Pylyshyn's argument is correct. Just that there's a possibility of it being wrong.
GPT-4
(1) While it is true that initial identification of neural correlates of consciousness may be based on self-reports, once these correlates are established, they can be used as objective measures to determine consciousness in other individuals without relying on self-reporting. In the thought experiment you mentioned, if a person is conscious but lacks the specific neural correlate, it would suggest that our understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness is incomplete and needs further refinement. This does not negate the possibility of finding objective measures of consciousness; it simply highlights the need for continued research and development in this area.
(2) The concern that science only measures correlations with reports of consciousness is valid, but it does not mean that we cannot develop a better understanding of consciousness itself. As our knowledge of the brain and cognitive processes advances, we may be able to identify more direct and reliable indicators of consciousness that go beyond mere correlations with self-reports. This would allow us to better detect and understand consciousness in both humans and AI systems.
(3) The possibility that Pylyshyn's argument cannot be disproven does not necessarily render the author's argument airtight. While it is true that we cannot currently disprove Pylyshyn's argument, this does not mean that it will remain impossible to disprove in the future. As our understanding of the brain and consciousness evolves, we may develop new methods and evidence that could potentially disprove Pylyshyn's argument. Additionally, the mere possibility of an argument being wrong does not automatically invalidate all attempts to understand or measure consciousness. It simply highlights the need for continued research and exploration in this field.
Me:
You say "While it is true that initial identification of neural correlates of consciousness may be based on self-reports, once these correlates are established, they can be used as objective measures to determine consciousness in other individuals without relying on self-reporting." How?
Imagine that the self-reporting was incorrect, and people who weren't conscious were reporting being conscious. Does it still seem like the test doesn't rely on those self-reports? Is it still objective?
Now, you might say that that uncertainty only comes in the case that the self-reporting was incorrect. But how would you validate that the self-reporting was correct?
So you're never getting an objective test of consciousness. You have to make the assumption that the self-reporting was correct in order to think that the test is correct.
So then when you bring this over to AI, why couldn't one also make the assumption that the AI's reports of consciousness are correct? How would you validate that the self-reporting were not correct? By 1. Assuming that the human reporting was correct and 2. By assuming that your knowledge of consciousness transfers from humans to AIs?
GPT-4:
You raise valid concerns about the potential limitations of relying on self-reporting to establish neural correlates of consciousness. It is true that if the initial self-reporting was incorrect, the subsequent objective measures based on those self-reports would also be flawed. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to develop objective measures of consciousness or that we should dismiss the potential for such measures altogether.
In the case of AI, the challenge lies in determining whether their self-reports of consciousness are genuine or merely a result of their programming. One approach to addressing this issue could involve developing a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms and processes that give rise to consciousness in biological systems and then examining whether similar mechanisms and processes are present in AI systems.
By studying the similarities and differences between human and AI consciousness, we may be able to develop more reliable methods for determining consciousness in AI systems that go beyond self-reporting. This could involve identifying specific neural or computational correlates of consciousness that are consistent across both human and AI systems, or developing new theoretical frameworks that can account for the unique aspects of AI consciousness.
In conclusion, while the reliance on self-reporting does present challenges in developing objective measures of consciousness, it does not mean that such measures are impossible to achieve. As our understanding of consciousness and the brain continues to advance, we may be able to develop more reliable and objective methods for determining consciousness in both humans and AI systems. This will likely involve a combination of empirical research, theoretical development, and interdisciplinary collaboration between fields such as neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence.
Me:
You say "It is true that if the initial self-reporting was incorrect, the subsequent objective measures based on those self-reports would also be flawed. However, this does not mean that it is impossible to develop objective measures of consciousness or that we should dismiss the potential for such measures altogether."
Then where is the flaw in the following argument?
1. Any test we make for consciousness relies on self-reporting (assumed)
2. We cannot validate whether the self-reports are correct (assumed)
3. We cannot be sure that any test we make for consciousness actually measures consciousness. (by 2 and 3)
To critique this argument, point out a particular assumption that is incorrect, or an inference step that is incorrect, and logically justify why it is incorrect. If you cannot find a critique in the argument, instead write a paragraph describing the impacts of this argument.
GPT-4:
The argument you presented is logically consistent, and it highlights the challenges and limitations we currently face in developing objective measures of consciousness. However, it is important to note that the assumptions made in this argument are based on our current understanding and methods for studying consciousness. As our knowledge and techniques evolve, these assumptions may no longer hold true.
The impact of this argument is that it emphasizes the need for continued research and development in the field of consciousness studies. It highlights the importance of questioning our current methods and assumptions, and it encourages us to explore alternative approaches for understanding and measuring consciousness. This could involve interdisciplinary collaboration between fields such as neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence, as well as the development of new theoretical frameworks and empirical methods.
Furthermore, this argument serves as a reminder that our understanding of consciousness is still in its early stages, and there is much we have yet to learn. By acknowledging the limitations of our current methods and assumptions, we can strive to develop a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of consciousness in both humans and AI systems.
